


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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVI, No. 20

FEBRUARY 28, 1947

INDIA FACES CRUCIAL TEST AS BRITAIN SETS WITHDRAWAL DATE

PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE announced on February 20 that a time limit, not later than June 1948, has been set for the end of British rule in India. Accordingly attention has been diverted momentarily from Britain's continued economic crisis at home to a closer examination of the Labor government's plans to abandon the "brightest jewel in the British crown." That the declaration has coincided with the coal crisis only emphasizes that London's withdrawal is directly related to the weakened economic position in which Britain now finds itself. Yet whatever Britain's economic prospects may be, the decision also reflects the growing tensions in India, not between India and the imperial power, but among opposing factions on the spot, which will be wholly on their own in the near future and will have to form an independent régime either through agreement among themselves or by a resort to force. It may be assumed that before June 1948 every effort will be made to bring the contesting groups together, and this will form the greater part of the task which the new Viceroy, Viscount Mountbatten, inherits from Lord Wavell, his predecessor at New Delhi.

BRITAIN'S OFFER OF FREEDOM REVISED. While the February 20 decision urges that the previous British plan of May 16, 1946 be followed in establishing the legal basis for an independent India, it does not make the offer of complete freedom by June 1948 contingent on any prescribed scheme. If a single state arises in India, it may be a centralized federation with minority guarantees as Britain proposed last May, or a more firmly integrated government such as the Congress party wishes. Or two nations may emerge—one predominantly Hindu, the other mainly Moslem (Pakistan)—as the Moslem League hopes. London's new announcement is most significant in that it opens up again these various

possibilities. In doing so it appears that full protection for minority groups, included in the May 16 plan, may now be disregarded, and it is on this score that the opposition party in London has criticized the government's declaration most severely.

The Attlee cabinet, however, has taken another approach essentially for the purpose of insuring an orderly establishment of a new government in India. If this is accomplished it may be hoped that Indians themselves will attend closely to the problem of safeguarding minority rights, whether it be the Sikhs, the Moslems in Hindu territories or Hindus in Moslem areas whose rights are in question. The most momentous issue which the British government has resolved by its latest move is that, during the remaining period of rule, the crown does not intend to side with either of the two main parties in India. If the policy which the London government has pursued since last May has not made this clear, the White Paper of February 20 will erase all doubts. The new plan is most explicit in the intention to hand over all power by the end of the time limit now established. "His Majesty's Government," the White Paper states, "will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India or in some areas to the existing provincial governments." As for the Indian Princely States, separate agreements will be negotiated, and it is assumed that these States in turn will come to terms with the new Indian régime.

REACTIONS IN INDIA. At present both the predominantly Hindu Congress party and the League are associated in the interim government under Jawaharlal Nehru as Vice President. But Nehru has recently urged London authorities to ask the Mos-

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lem members of his cabinet to withdraw since the Moslem League and its President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, have refused to take part in the Constituent Assembly, which is attempting to write the federal and provincial constitutions of the new regime. For the past few months, however, the Labor government has been loath to take this type of action as being prejudicial to its efforts to bring the two groups together. The February 20 statement may induce the leaders of the Moslem League to join the Constituent Assembly, but many observers fear it will cause them to stand even more firmly for their policy of Pakistan.

Viewed in this light the February 20 announcement is a gamble, which will have been lost if the Moslems refuse irrevocably to cooperate in framing a new constitution. Proof that it is a losing gamble may come soon, for the Moslems have shown themselves to be consistently intransigent. The League has demonstrated before that it was indeed banking on a policy of divide-and-rule on Britain's part. Although the League's working committee has made no statement since Britain's latest departure, Jinnah declared on February 23 that the League would not yield "an inch" in its demand for Pakistan. The working committee of the League will not meet until the middle of next month, but it is doubtful that the com-

LONDON-CAIRO AT ODDS

Britain's efforts to protect the life lines of a declining empire are providing more and more business for the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of Commons on February 18 that Britain would ask the UN to solve the Palestine problem. On the same day, the British representative on the Security Council, Sir Alexander Cadogan, presented the charge that Albania had committed an "international crime" by sowing mines illegally off the Albanian coast. Egypt's decision to refer its dispute with Britain to the Security Council, announced in the Egyptian Parliament by Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha on January 27, may draw world attention to still other British imperial difficulties.

DISPUTED ISSUES. During the past year, amidst anti-British rioting in Egypt, negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 have aroused controversy on three issues: the time required by Britain to dismantle her military establishments and evacuate her troops; the nature of joint action to be taken by the two countries in case of war or threat of war; and the future of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a condominium which has been ruled jointly by Britain and Egypt since 1899. Agreement can be reached on the first two issues, but there appears to be no acceptable compromise on the future of the Sudan. However, according to unofficial reports

mittee will show a greater spirit of compromise than its President.

Nehru, whose opinion may be taken to represent that of the Congress party, expressed his views about the British decision on February 22, when he characterized it as wise and courageous. At the same time he indicated that the work of the Constituent Assembly would continue and invited the Moslems to join in its task, saying that "it can proceed only on a voluntary basis. There can be no compulsion except the compulsion of events, which none can ignore." The attitude revealed here is important, for although the Congress party is firmly entrenched in the government and almost solely in charge of the constitution-making body, it cannot compel the Moslem League to enter the Assembly. Nehru's attitude, however, reveals serious underlying differences that separate the two communities in India, and the longer they stay apart the more likely is it that the situation will deteriorate until civil war becomes inevitable. That point may never be reached, or violence may occur only when British forces, both political and military, are removed from India. If the latter proves true, Indians have a little over a year in which to test their own statesmanship before Britain's political power is withdrawn.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

OVER FUTURE OF SUDAN

from Cairo on February 21, Egyptian delegates to the UN have advised their government to exhaust all other means of settlement before appealing to the Security Council, where Egypt could accomplish little more than the airing of its grievances before the world. It may be that Egypt's threat is simply a further effort to force concessions from Britain—like Siam's unfulfilled decision to appeal to the UN against France over the border controversy with Indo-China. But the British, whose intentions to withdraw from Egypt are clear, show no disposition to concede Egypt's demand for the Sudan. Since no political party in Egypt cares to risk its future by surrendering under British pressure the long cherished objective of Egyptian nationalism—"the unity of the Nile Valley"—Egyptian leaders may consider themselves forced to carry out their threat to appeal to the UN.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is an area of almost one million square miles inhabited by nearly seven million Arabs and Negroes. When Britain's empire-builders first entered Egypt they justified further expansion southward into the Sudan on the grounds that "Egypt was the Nile and the Nile was Egypt." Today, however, Britain refuses Egypt's demand for the "unity of the Nile Valley," contending that when the Sudanese are ready for self-government they should determine for themselves whether they want independence or union with Egypt. To Britain the

Sudan is important because of its economic potentialities and its strategic 450-mile Red Sea coastline. British development of Sudanese agriculture and transportation has made this once turbulent and unproductive land one of the most promising areas under British control.

EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM. Egypt's demand for the Sudan is primarily the result of an intense nationalism, although the chief argument for union is that the economic life of Egypt depends upon the Nile. Egyptian nationalists claim not only the Sudan but parts of Eritrea and Libya, and see in the Arab League an opportunity to expand Egypt's power and influence. The problem of the Sudan's future is also complicated by Egyptian politics. Egypt's most noted party, the Wafd, has a long record of irresponsible political agitation. The Wafd can probably carry 60 per cent of the popular vote but it boycotted the elections of 1944, and its leader, Nahas Pasha, is disliked by King Farouk. Egypt's present cabinet represents a coalition of more conservative parties which the Wafd accuses of pro-British sentiment. The Wafd would doubtless like to force this coalition out of power, win a majority in new elections, and get credit for signing a treaty with Britain favorable to Egyptian interests. Some observers have even suggested that had Nahas Pasha been in power, a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty would already have been signed. This view is questionable, however, because negotiations between Britain and Egypt have broken down many times in the past twenty-five years whether the Wafd was in or out of power, and the status of the Sudan has always been a central point of conflict.

SUDANESE OPINION. What do the Sudanese think about this dispute over their future? Such opinion as is expressed is found among the 4,500,000 Arabs in the northern part of the territory; the people of the south are primitive Negro tribesmen speaking many tongues, none of which has written

records. Political opinion among the few thousand educated Arabs is sharply divided between two factions—the Umma and the Ashigga. The Umma, which is strong in the western area, wants independence for the Sudan, while the Ashigga, which finds its support in the east and the big towns, favors union with Egypt. Umma leaders believe that Egyptian domination would bring to the Sudan the extremes of wealth and poverty from which Egypt suffers today. The Umma, whose members fill the higher government posts open to Sudanese, claims half a million followers, but is probably outnumbered by the Ashigga. In general the Ashigga want a form of union that would place the Sudan under the Egyptian crown but in control of its own internal affairs. The London *Times* of January 24, however, published a report from its correspondent in the Sudan to the effect that many Ashigga members seek union with Egypt not as an end in itself, but as a means of getting rid of the British and thus preparing the way for independence.

This political rivalry is complicated and accentuated by a sharp religious conflict between the followers of Ali el Mirghani and Abdul Rahman el Mahdi, the latter the son of a noted religious leader and adventurer who rebelled against Egyptian rule in the 1880's. Ali el Mirghani's family was driven into exile by the Mahdists in 1885, and the Mirghanists are favorable to the Ashigga political program because they fear that the Mahdi has designs to become King of the Sudan.

Neither Britain nor Egypt seems to consider the Sudan ready for self government at present. The British plan calls for a continuation of the condominium for about twenty years. From what Bevin told the House of Commons on January 27 it appears that the Labor government is ready to acknowledge "unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt" on condition that when they are prepared to do so, the Sudanese shall have "the right to chose the future status of the Sudan." Egypt, however insist on recognition now of its sovereignty over the Sudan. A way out of this dilemma might be found if the Sudan could be placed under a twenty-year joint Anglo-Egyptian trusteeship supervised by the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

VERNON MCKAY

Recent FPA Publications

INDIA'S PROBLEMS AS A FREE NATION
by Grant S. McClellan

THE ARAB LEAGUE IN WORLD POLITICS
by Vernon McKay

**INFLUENCE OF ARMED FORCES ON U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY**
by Blair Bolles

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
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Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.**

The Danzig Dilemma, by John Brown Mason. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1946. \$4.00

Well documented, objective study of an International Settlement established prior to World War II.

Washington News Letter



U.S.-CANADA PACT UNDERLINES STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ARCTIC

The Arctic region in the event of war could be one of the world's chief strategic centers as a result of the long-range bomber and the guided missile, which in time will be able readily to span the polar seas. This possibility explains why the United States and Canada, at the behest of Washington, agreed on February 12 to make permanent the arrangements for voluntary military cooperation which date from 1940, when the two countries set up the Joint Defense Board. The agreement is a compromise between the desire of American military officers to conduct military operations and investigations in northern Canada regularly, and the concern of civilian officials in each government lest exaggerated martial displays instill fear in other nations and disturb world relationships. Its effect will be to enable the United States to test weapons and equipment in Canada without greatly adding to the countries' combined military power.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. The policy of the United States today remains what it was on August 20, 1938, when President Roosevelt said: "The people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened." The Truman administration assumes that what affects or might affect Canadian security affects ours. The terms of the pact provide for exchange of military personnel, permit each country to send observers to the other's military exercises, envisage standardization of arms (excepting atomic weapons), and authorize reciprocal use of military facilities and areas in the two countries, although granting the United States no Canadian bases. Full sovereignty is reserved to each power, and there is no terminal date. In accordance with the spirit of Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, both governments sent copies to Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, and announced that obligations assumed by the UN would take precedence over any obligations in the two-country agreement.

Reluctant to act as northern buffer for the United States except under conditions that would contribute to peace, Canada has stressed the non-military implications of the agreement. Prime Minister Mackenzie King on February 12 said that the primary objective of the permanent joint cooperation would be to expand knowledge about the North in order to develop its resources. Canada, in all its northern undertakings since the end of World War II, has exhibited the intention to avoid offending the U.S.S.R. For example, the Canadian government last spring rejected the proposed label, "Operation

Muskox," in favor of a less bellicose name, "Exercise Muskox," when it sent a detachment of the Canadian Army on a 3,000-mile journey to test mechanized military equipment in snow at low temperatures. In positive recognition of the Arctic's military importance, the Canadian government has established a new Northwest Military District, with headquarters at Edmonton.

The agreement nevertheless has excited interest and fear abroad because both the United States and the Soviet Union are morbidly sensitive about each other's concern with the Arctic. Moscow newspapers criticized the United States-Canada agreement as a move unfriendly to Russia. The State Department on January 10 said that the United States would expect to be consulted if Norway granted Russia the use of bases in Spitzbergen. The Soviet press protested when the United States last year sought the permanent use of military bases in Iceland. Unable to secure those bases, the United States has experimented with combat in Arctic regions on North American soil and waterways. Planes based on the aircraft carrier *Midway* tested flight conditions over Davis Strait last spring. The Army and Navy in January sought new knowledge of northern conditions through the work of Task Force Frigid in Alaska. Giving a military man's alarmist justification for this Arctic interest, General George C. Kenney, head of the Strategic Air Command, Army Air Forces, predicted on January 26 that future attack against the United States would come—if it ever does come—across the North Polar basin in the form of pilotless fleets of planes bearing atom bombs.

MILITARY FOREIGN POLICY PATTERN. The agreement with Canada, worked out by the Permanent Joint Defense Board, fits into the pattern of United States military foreign policy, resting not on treaty but simply on executive understanding. President Truman did not submit the Canadian agreement to Congress. Without Congressional approval the United States also agreed last autumn with Britain to standardize the small arms of the two countries and continues to consult with that government on high military matters through the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, set up during World War II. This policy of executive independence may not have world-wide application, however, for the Administration expects at present to seek consent from Congress either by resolution or treaty approval should it make military agreements with China or the American Republics.

BLAIR BOLLES

F. P. A. BOOKSHELF

The Roosevelt I Knew, by Frances Perkins. New York, Viking Press, 1946. \$3.75

Miss Perkins, long a close friend and political associate of Roosevelt, presents an exceptionally discerning picture of the late President both in private life and as a public figure. The growth of Roosevelt's understanding of and sympathy for people in all walks of life is particularly well recounted.

The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes, by Etienne Mantoux, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946. \$4.50

A brilliantly written refutation of the arguments advanced by Keynes in 1919 to prove that the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were not economically sound. The author, who died in World War II, contends that Germany had the capacity to pay, and that there would have been no transfer problems.

The Rebirth of the German Church, by Stuart W. Herman. Harper, 1946. \$2.50

One of the first American churchmen to enter Germany in 1945, the author describes the present church leaders and the measures taken in attempting to eliminate Nazi influences. There is an introduction by Pastor Niemoller.

The Revival of Palestine, by Joshua Ziman. New York, Sharon Books, 1946. \$2.50

A useful, concise guide which follows the development of the Jewish settlement in Palestine since 1880.

Eamon de Valera, by M. J. MacManus. New York, Ziff-Davis, 1946. \$3.00

A laudatory estimate of the man who kept Ireland neutral during the war despite outside pressure.

Spheres of Influence, by Sydney Morrell. New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946. \$3.50

An analysis of the Big Three struggle for supremacy in Iran, Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia by a London *Daily Express* correspondent who worked with the OWI in this country during the war.

As He Saw It, by Elliott Roosevelt. New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946. \$3.00

An interpretation of President Roosevelt's aims as revealed in intimate talks and through first-hand observations when Elliott was his father's aide at most of the Big Power conferences held during the war, and significant facts underlying these meetings.

The Congress of Vienna, by Harold Nicolson. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946. \$4.00

Lest there be ghosts of this famous conference about during the United Nations deliberations, Nicolson warns that analogies are "so frequent that they may mislead." He writes vividly and includes several character studies deftly sketched.

Malaya—Outline of a Colony, by Victor Purcell. New York, Thomas Nelson, 1946. \$2.50

A well written history and portrayal of Malayan life by an English scholar and official with twenty years experience in Malaya.

Liberia: A Century of Survival 1847-1947, by Raymond Leslie Buell. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947. \$1.50

A severe indictment of the Americo-Liberian ruling class, and a constructive program for Liberian development with United States aid. American readers will be interested in the author's emphasis on the backwardness of independent Liberia in contrast to the nearby British and French dependencies in West Africa.

Oil Across the World, by Charles M. Wilson. New York, Longmans, Green, 1946. \$3.50

After a historical resume of pipelines in general the author tells the remarkable story of American use of long, pressure-operated metal pipelines for oil transport.

In A Changing Brazil, by Elsie Noble Caldwell. New York, Richard R. Smith, 1946. \$3.00

Most interesting in its account of upper-class life in the interior, this is a sympathetic portrayal of Brazil since the turn of the century, with an accent on the picturesque.

The U.S.S.R.: A Geographical Survey, by James S. Gregory and D. W. Shave. New York, Wiley, 1946. \$4.25

Two British geographers present a valuable study of the geographical background of Russia's historical development, as well as an analysis of regional geography, based on study of Russian material.

European Crossroad: A Soviet Journalist in the Balkans, by Ilya Ehrenburg. New York, Knopf, 1947. \$2.00

The well-known Russian journalist and novelist gives his impressions of a post-war trip to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, with sympathy for the plight of war-racked peoples, and hope for the ultimate triumph of "progressive" forces.

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING

A Special Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated,

will be held at The Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N. Y.

on Saturday, March 15, 1947

The brief business meeting will be held at 12:15, immediately preceding the luncheon meeting.

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

1. Amending Subdivision 5 of the Certificate of Incorporation to read as follows:

"5. The number of directors of the Corporation shall be not less than twenty-two and not more than fifty."

2. Amending Article XI of the Constitution to read as follows:

"XI. This Constitution may be amended or repealed at any meeting of the Association by a two-thirds vote of those present or at any meeting of the Board of Directors by a two-thirds vote of those present."

The purpose of these amendments is to make possible the adoption of a plan of branch representation which has been worked out by the Board of Directors, and also to enable the Board of Directors to make other changes in the Constitution without requiring a vote of the Association. For the information of the members, the Constitution of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, is the equivalent of the by-laws of other organizations which are customarily subject to amendment by the Board of Directors.

WILLIAM W. LANCASTER
Chairman of the Board

*Please cut along this line and sign and return the proxy to the office of the
Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.*

PROXY

I authorize James Grafton Rogers or Helen M. Daggett or a substitute to vote at the special meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, to be held on March 15, 1947.

for or against the first proposal set forth in the Notice of Meeting;

for or against the second proposal set forth in the Notice of Meeting.

Unless contrary instructions are given, this Proxy will be voted in favor of the two above proposals.

(Sign here)

Member